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I. INTRODUCTION

Lawyers may obtain valuable information by communicating with
jurors after a trial. Post-trial interviews may be used for several purposes, such as gaining insight regarding trial strategies to uncovering
indiscretions surrounding the verdict. The permissibility of post-trial
interviews with jurors is unresolved in West Virginia. This Note submits that more uniform treatment of this educational and informative
procedure across the state will decrease potential prejudice and harassment created by abusive lawyers who appear to practice within the
confines of the current regulation.
Part II demonstrates the current inconsistencies throughout the
state, by reporting the results of an independent survey of West
Virginia's circuit judges regarding their treatment of post-trial interviews in their jurisdiction. Part III reviews existing statutory and case
law governing post-trial communications with jurors, and compares the
old Code of Professional Conduct to the new Model Rules of Profes-
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sional Responsibility. Part IV of this Note presents arguments to support and refute the value and appropriateness of post-trial interviews.
Finally, this Note concludes by reaffirming that more precise, uniform
regulation of post-trial communications with jurors is needed in West
Virginia.
II.

SURVEY OF JUDICIAL CIRCUITS

Marked disparities exist among West Virginia's judicial circuits
concerning the legal status of post-trial interviews and other post-trial
communications with jurors.' A survey of West Virginia's Circuit
Judges confirmed this disparity.' Judges from the thirty-one judicial
circuits were invited to participate in a survey of their current treatment of post-trial interviews with jurors.3 Responses received from
twenty judges reflected a variety of viewpoints and conflicting rules.
Of the twenty judges who responded to the survey, thirteen either
permit or do not expressly prohibit post-trial interviews in some circumstances.4 Six judges do not permit post-trial interviews until the
jurors' term of service has ended.5 The primary justification for this
stipulation was concern for decreased objectivity of jurors who may
participate in future trials involving the interviewing lawyer from a
previous trial.6 One West Virginia judge concerned with juror status

1. Survey of West Virginia Circuit Judges, 1992 (on file with the West Virginia Law
ReWew) [hereinafter Survey].
2. Id The survey was mailed in questionnaire format and consisted of the following
inquiries: 1) Do you currently permit attorneys in your county to conduct post-trial interviews with jurors? If so, under what circumstances? If not, please indicate the reasons for
this prohibition; 2) Is there a particular rule of law or controlling case law that you consider when maldng such a determination?; 3) How frequently, if ever, has this issue been
raised in your jurisdiction?; 4) Have you ever imposed sanctions on an attorney for conducting post-trial interviews with jurors?; 5) What is your opinion on the propriety of such
interviews? Do you support them for educational purposes, or would you support a complete
ban on post-trial interviews?; 6) Do you object to being quoted in my law review article?
3. Of the thirty-eight judges solicited, twenty responded to the survey. Responses of
all judges is greatly appreciated. Because some judges wished to remain anonymous, the
names of all judges have been omitted to maintain uniformity.
4. Survey, supra note 1.
5. Id
6. Id No judges cited W. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 3.5 as a
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emphasized the importance of avoiding the appearance of impropriety.7
The significance of juror status has been emphasized in several cases
involving the permissibility of post-trial interviews! Permitting unsupervised communications between lawyers and future jurors places the
impartiality of the jurors in question and may result in diminished
confidence in jury verdicts.
It is surprising, therefore, that four judges participating in the
survey reported that they permit post-trial interviews at any time after
trial.9 Three of these four never even mentioned juror status as a consideration for permitting post-trial interviews.' ° Two claimed that participation in post-verdict interviews is entirely within the discretion of
the juror, provided that the jurors know that they are not obligated to
submit to an interview." The third reportedly permits interviews in
all circumstances.' 2 Of these four, only one judge specifically addressed juror status. He reported that jurors in his circuit serve on an
on-call basis for four months. Each juror serves on an average of two
to five cases, quite possibly serving on a case with the same attorney
again.13 Despite this arrangement, attorneys are permitted to talk with
jurors following a trial, if the juror agrees. This practice could threaten
public perception of the jury process because it invites unethical behavior and lawyer impropriety. The inevitable bias and subjectivity
created by this process may currently be controlled because jurors
being qualified for subsequent trials must disclose whether they have
previously been interviewed by either attorney presiding in the present
reason for delaying their permission until after the juror's term has ended. See supra part
rrI.A.
7. Id.
8. In re Delgado, 306 S.E.2d 591 (S.C. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1057 (1984)
(defense attorney found guilty of unethical conduct when he conducted past-trial interviews
with a juror in the presence of a person whom he knew was about to serve as a juror in
an upcoming trial that he was handling); State v. Socolofsky, 666 P.2d 725 (Kan. 1983)
(holding district attorney guilty of violating Rules of Professional Responsibility after anonymously mailing newspaper clippings to prospective jurors following their verdict in a previous trial).
9. Survey, supra note 1.
10. Ird
11. IM
12. IM
13. Id.
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case.14 However, whether such disclosure results in automatic disqualification was not reported.
Judges from two circuits reported that they will consider granting
permission for post-trial interviews in special circumstances. Both
appear to have adopted procedures parallel to the Local Rules for the
United States District Court for the Northern 15 and Southem 16 Districts of West Virginia, which impose a good cause requirement and
application to-the court before permission for post-trial communications
with jurors will be granted. For example, one of the judges reportedly
will allow post-trial interviews only under court supervision after good
cause has been shown.17 Interviews must be conducted by hearing
before the court, where the judge and both lawyers have the opportunity to question the jurors. This judge bases his decision on the inherent power of the court to protect jurors from harassment and undue
pressure to change or cast doubt on their verdict. 9 He also stressed
the need to impress upon the parties and the public that the case is
over when the verdict has been reached and that jurors are not compelled to answer questions nor attempt to explain or justify their verdict without a showing of good cause.20
Similar rules are enforced in another circuit, where permission for
post-trial interviews must be sought on a motion to the court, and interviews are permitted only in extraordinary circumstances. 2' Before
discharging the jury, the judge instructs the jurors that they are not
required to submit to interviews regarding the verdict.22
In contrast, post-trial interviews are expressly forbidden in five
judicial circuits. One judge opines that jurors are opposed to discussing
their verdicts with attorneys, and therefore protects them from intrusive

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

IM
N.D. W. 'VA. CT. R. 1.19 (1993).
S.D. W. VA. CT. R. 3.02 (1993).
Survey, supra note 1.

Id

Id
Id
Id
22. Id
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post-trial inquiries through the inherent power of the court.2" He noted that the utmost freedom of debate in the jury room, including open
discussion and complete candor, is in the best interest of the public
and the judicial system. Further, he states that in discharging their
duties and responsibilities, jurors should be able to express their views
without fear of personal criticism or the need to explain their ac4
2

tions.

Judges also cite juror inconvenience and nuisance as primary justifications for prohibiting post-trial interviews.Y One judge fears that
inquiries into the verdict may have a chilling effect on jurors in future
service, as well as on 26
present jurors who fear they may be questioned
verdict.
their
following
Another judge emphasized the chilling effect that breaching the
sanctity of the verdict might have on juror -participation.27 This judge
surmised that jurors would be less likely to participate fully if they
thought their words might be repeated to the public or the media and
that any benefits from such interviews are outweighed by the need to
protect the sanctity of the jury room. 28 He also noted a historical prohibition of post-trial interviews of jurors in his circuit, and he reported
that a straw vote on the issue (for informational purposes only) had
been taken at a recent county bar association meeting. Those opposed
to post-trial interviews prevailed by a slight margin.29
Several judges neither explicitly permit or prohibit post-trial interviews. One judge who supports a complete ban on such interviews has
not had the opportunity to rule on the issue because it has never been
raised in his jurisdiction. 0 It is possible that lawyers in his and other
jurisdictions are simply conducting post-trial interviews outside of the
knowledge of the court without express authority to do so. Another

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
1d
Id.

kL
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id
30. IM
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judge who doesn't expressly permit or prohibit interviews reported that
attorneys that go too far will have to answer for their conduct.31 The
vagueness of such language eliminates its usefulness as a guideline for
lawyers who wish to communicate with jurors following a trial. How
should "going too far" be interpreted? This example of ambiguity
illustrates the need for more distinct regulation of post-trial interviews.
The need for more uniform treatment of post-trial communication
with jurors is illustrated by a comparison of two bordeing counties in
West Virginia. Ironically, post-trial interviews are ordinarily permitted
in Monongalia County yet expressly forbidden in Marion County.3
Such variation creates confusion about acceptable versus unethical
behavior, particularly for the novice trial lawyer or one who practices
in several states. More distinct and uniform treatment of this issue may
avoid confusion, decrease unethical conduct, and protect jurors from
unauthorized questioning. An examination of the current rules in West
Virginia exposes the source of confusion and underscores the need for
statewide uniformity.
Ill.

A.

INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL RESTRICTIONS

Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility

The existing rule governing communications with jurors appears in
the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. The Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia adopted Rule 3.5 of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct verbatim. 33 It states:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official
by means prohibited by law;

31.

Id

32. Id
33. W. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.5 (1993). The ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT were adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals on June 30, 1988 with an effective date of Jan. 1, 1989. These rules replaced the
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY previously in force in West Virginia.
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communicate ex parte with such person except as permitted by
(b)
...34
law; .

Although Rule 3.5 clearly governs lawyers' communications with
jurors, post-verdict extension of the rule is not articulated. Because the
rule does not specifically address post-trial contact with jurors, and
since there are no other West Virginia court rules which do, the legal
status of post-trial interviews in West Virginia is unclear.
Before adopting Rule 3.5, West Virginia followed the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. 35 Under the former rule, the permissibility of post-trial contact with jurors was apparent. The Model
Code explicitly authorized post-trial contacts, provided they were conducted in an ethical fashion.36 An examination of the text of the relevant portion of the Model Code confirms this.
After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with which
the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions or make
comments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or
embarrass the juror or to influence his actions in future jury service. 7

The language in the Model Code specifically addressed the types
of juror contacts authorized after trial and provided guidelines for
conducting post-trial interviews. Additionally, the Model Code acknowledged that a complete prohibition of all post-trial conmmunications would restrict trial lawyers from ascertaining whether a verdict
might be subject to legal challenge."
Ethical Considerations included in the Model Code offered similar
guidelines 9 which articulated that any interviews or communications
by a lawyer should be conducted with deference to the personal feel34. Id.
35. Id. editor's notes.
36. See generally Dale R. Agthe, Annotation, Propriety of Attorney's Communication
with Jurors After Trial, 19 A.L.R.4th 1209 (1983).
37. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBUITY DR 7-108(D) (1980).
38. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBImLTY EC 7-29 (1980).
39. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility consisted of three parts: Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. MODEL CODE OF PROFSSIONAL RESPONSmILITY Preamble (1980).
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ings of the jurors. However, "[t]he Ethical Considerations are
aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body
of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many
specific situations. ' 4°
In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 41 The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the Model Rules in
their entirety in 1988,42 thereby replacing DR 7-108(D) with Model
Rule 3.5. In doing so, the court eliminated the language from the
Model Code regarding post-trial contact. 43 Although Rule 3.5 prohibits ex parte communications with jurors "except as permitted by
law," 44 nothing in the language of the text of the rule indicates that
this refers to communications after trial. In adopting Model Rule 3.5,
the West Virginia Supreme Court omitted that portion of the old Codebased rule that specifically addressed post-trial communications. This
omission of post-trial language may actually exclude post-trial communications from regulation, compelling individual state courts to adopt
additional rules which specifically address such contacts. Thus, where
Model Rule 3.5 is adopted verbatim, the absence of additional rules
may leave the area of post-trial communications unregulated.
Several other factors indicate that Model Rule 3.5 does not apply
to post-trial communications with jurors. It is questionable whether the
use of the term "juror" in the new rule encompasses a former juror
since discharged from service. Arguably, once a juror is discharged
from service, he is no longer a juror. Further, Part Three of the Rules

40. Id.
41. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was abolished when the House of
Delegates of the ABA adopted the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT on Aug. 2,
1983. See THOMAs D. .MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS ON PRO-

FESSIONAL RESPONSMIUrY 1 (1992).
42. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 33, 37 and accompanying text.
44. W. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5 (1993). In discussing posttrial contact with jurors, the annotation to Model Rule 3.5 explains that the rule permits
only those contacts otherwise permitted by law. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.5, at 372 (1992).
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of Professional Conduct is primarily concerned with protecting parties
and the tribunal from uncompromising advocacy, and Model Rule 3.5
focuses solely on protecting the tribunal from disruptive influences.45
This casts further doubt on the applicability of Rule 3.5 to post-trial
interviews, because the time has passed for influencing or disrupting
the tribunal once the trial has ended. As the issue of post-trial interviews with jurors has never been raised before the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, the proper interpretation of Rule 3.5 regarding post-trial communications is undetermined. Case law from other
jurisdictions interpreting Model Rule 3.5 is equally sparse because
most states
that have adopted the rule have done so only in the last
4
six yea. .

Scholars disagree as to whether Model Rule 3.5 applies to posttrial contact with jurors. Charles W. Wolfram, author of Modem Legal
Ethics, claims that the Model Rules "appear to have prohibited
most.., post-trial contact with jurors in Rule 3.5 unless it is expressly permitted by law."4 7 This interpretation suggests that unless expressly authorized by additional court rules or statutes, post-trial interviews are not permitted in states which have adopted Rule 3.5 verbatim. The American Bar Association has agreed that Rule 3.5(b) allows
only those contacts which are otherwise permitted by law.4" This is
not the likely interpretation of the rule in West Virginia, where posttrial interviews are permitted in many, if not most, of the judicial circuits.49 Furthermore, in specifically discussing juror contact following
a verdict, the ABA referred to Rule 3.5(a)'s prohibition against influencing jurors "by means prohibited by law."50 This may actually sug45. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERiNG;
A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.5:101 at 654 (2d ed.

Supp. 1991).
46. Telephone Interview with Liz Cohen, Assistant Editor for the Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA Ethics Committee (Sept. 15, 1992).
47. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 11.4.4, at 608 (Practitioners
ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
48. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.5, at 372 (1992);
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUC, No. 121 at 61:804 (1992)
(stating that other court rules or case law within the jurisdiction must be referred to in
order to determine whether certain ex parte communications are legitimate).
49. Survey, supra note 1.
50. ABA/BNA

LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, No. 121 at 61:806
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gest the opposite view, that Rule 3.5 permits post-trial contact with
jurors unless additional court rules or case law in the jurisdiction specificaly prohibit them. This seems to be the view of Hazard & Hodes,
authors of The Law of Lawyering, a leading treatise on the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. 51 The authors state that the duties in
Rule 3.5 are enforced through court rules and common law.52 By suggesting that additional court rules or common law are required for enforcement of Rule 3.5, the authors support the theory that absent such
outside authority, a jurisdiction that has adopted Rule 3.5 is without
law on the issue of post-trial contact with jurors. This view is more
consistent with the current practice in West Virginia, where the permissibility of post-trial communication with jurors appears to remain
entirely within the discretion of the judge in a particular jurisdiction.5 In fact, of the twenty judges who responded to the survey,54
none were able to articulate a particular rule of law used when deciding whether to allow an attorney to conduct post-trial interviews with
jurors.

55

Hazard & Hodes further note that the Model Code refers to juror
communications before, during, and after trial, 56 while Rule 3.5 may
not apply to all three situations. The authors intimate that Rule 3.5
does not prohibit post-trial communications by their suggestion that
under Rule 3.5, "it is not improper to interview jurors after a trial (in
order to assess effectiveness of one's trial tactics, for example), [but] it
would be improper to chastise a juror for a 'wrong' verdict, or insist
57
on interviewing an unwilling juror.
Although the Hazard and Hodes imply that Rule 3.5 does not
govern post-trial contact, they explain that any matters not included in

(1992).
51. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 45, § 3.5:101 at 654.
52. Id
53. Survey, supra note 1.
54. Id
55. Id Of the twenty judges responding to the question of whether they used a particular rule of law to decide whether to permit post-trial interviews with jurors, eighteen responded "none," while two others cited the inherent power of the court. Id
56. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 45, § 4.4:101 at 754.
57. Id
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Rule 3.5 on improper influence should be considered covered by Rule
4.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 8 This rule states that "[i]n
representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights
of such a person."5 9 Therefore, Rule 4.4 may be a plausible alternative to a complete absence of regulation of post-trial contact in jurisdictions which have adopted the Model Rules, because although representation arguably ends with the trial, in reality lawyers may perform
various client services pertaining to trial long after its conclusion. The
application of Rule 4.4 to post-trial contact would result in a resurgence of the language of Model Code DR 7-108(D), permitting posttrial contact which is not unduly harassing or embarrassing.
The apparent conflict among scholars, as well as the diverse treatment of the concrete issue in West Virginia, illustrates Model Rule
3.5's inadequate regulation of post-trial communications with jurors.
Perhaps that is why the earlier Mode Code remains in force in several
jurisdictions, 60 and why many states which have adopted Model Rule
3.5 have done so with provisions for post-trial contact. For example,
Maryland, 61 Illinois, 62 and Minnesota 63 have adopted Model Rule
3.5 but have retained the language of DR 7-108(D) regarding post-trial
contacts with jurors. Even the states that have significantly altered the
ABA model have generally retained portions of the relevant Model
Code provisions."' Equal treatment of Rule 3.5 is needed in West
Virginia to provide more uniform regulation of post-trial contact.

58. lId
59. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4 (1983).
60. GA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 7-108(D) (1992); HAW. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7-108(D) (1992); IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBELrrY 7-108(D) (1992); OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7-108(D) (1992); OR.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7-108 (1992); VT. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7-108(D) (1992); VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7-107(C)

(1992).
61.
62.
63.
64.

MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5 (1992).
ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5 (1992).
MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5(c) (1992).
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, No. 121 at 61:802

(1992).
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The issue of post-trial communications with jurors has been more
clearly defined in West Virginia's federal courts. In both the Northem65 and Southern Districts, post-trial communication with jurors
is authorized only by permission of the court. However, a peculiar distinction exists between the two federal districts. In the Northern District, authorization of post-trial interviews hinges upon the requesting
party's demonstration of good cause.67 In contrast, the Southern District permits post-trial contact unless the opposing party shows good
cause to deny it.6' Therefore, the opponent in the Southern District
bears the burden of demonstrating why the contact should be prohibited. Despite this variation, the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Northern and Southern Districts of West Virginia do
provide practitioner with reliable guidance when attempting to communicate with jurors after trial.69 Although neither rule specifically
defines the good cause requirement, both set forth the proper procedure
and prerequisites for post-trial contacts with jurors. 0
B.

The Need For Uniformity

West Virginia's circuit courts need a more uniform rule to protect
jurors from umdue harassment by unregulated lawyers and to prevent
the unethical behavior by uninformed lawyers. Absent a case ruling by
the West Virginia Supreme Court involving post-trial contact, uniformity and precision can occur only through modification to the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Without some type of guidance on this issue,
West Virginia lawyers may be misinformed when communicating with
jurors, doing what they believe may be acceptable in their jurisdiction.
Under the present state regulation, intrusive badgering may be excused
in one jurisdiction, while responsible inquiries may be prohibited in
another. This creates difficulty for lawyers in discerning what is considered acceptable conduct in a particular county.

65.

N.D. W. VA. CT. R. 1.19 (1993).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

S.D. W. VA. CT. R. 3.02 (1993).
N.D. W. VA. CT. R. 1.19 (1993).
S.D. W. VA. CT. R. 3.02 (1993).
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
Id
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has several available options to achieve more uniform regulation of post-trial interviews. First, the court may retain Model Rule 3.5 but reinstate the portion of the Model Code pertaining to post-trial contact. 71 This would
authorize all post-trial contact with jurors that is not harassing or prejudicial. However, the imprecise language of the Model Code invites
misinterpretation. Before true uniformity can be realized, any resurgence of the old Model Code will require an explicit definition of
"harassing and prejudicial," as well as further explanation of "calculated merely to influence future service." 7 Without this clarification, the
regulation would condone post-trial communication without defining
the permissible boundaries of such contacts.
Alternatively, the court may promulgate an entirely new rule concerning post-trial interviews. The court may follow the federal model,
which authorizes post-trial interviews only through express permission
of the court.73 This method is reportedly followed in at least one
West Virginia judicial circuit.74 In similarl manner, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently ordered an amendment of its
Code of Professional Responsibility75 by adopting, a new rule which
forbids lawyers from communicating with jurors after a trial without
first obtaining permission from the court.76
Requiring court approval may ensure that more control is maintained over post-trial communications, greatly reducing the opportunity
for abusive and unnecessary interviews. However, reserving this power
to the courts threatens uniformity because the ultimate consent for

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108(D) (1980).
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 65, 66 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
75. Formerly, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108(D) was followed.
76. MASS. Cr. RULE 3:07 (1992). For a developmental perspective of the court's
treatment of post-trial interviews, see Commonwealth v. Fidler, 385 N.E.2d 513 (Mass.
1979) (court warned that lawyers should refrain from initiating post-trial contact with jurors);
Commonwealth v. Solis, 553 N.E.2d 938 (Mass. 1990) (refusing to exclude evidence about
jurors' improper contact with a court official, which was discovered through a post-trial
interview; the court stated that the lawyer's conduct violated Fidler but not any ethics rules,
signaling that a change in the ethics rule was needed).
71.
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post-trial interviews still remains within the discretion of the judge.
Accordingly, statewide inconsistent treatment of this issue would persist. Aspiring for uniformity in application compels more precise legislation with less emphasis on individual judicial interpretation.
Additionally, a good cause requirement creates an impossible situation. Communicating with jurors following a trial may be a lawyer's
only means of discovering grounds to impeach the verdict; however,
obtaining a court's permission to contact jurors hinges on the presentation of sufficient grounds. Thus, the availability of post-trial interviews
may be limited to celebrities and those involved in highly publicized
trials, where there is a greater probability that juror misconduct will be
exposed. Lawyers may be forced to risk ethics violations to obtain
evidence necessary to satisfy the good cause requirement.
Finally, rather than amending the existing regulation, the court
may provide insight and guidance by issuing a ruling which interprets
Model Rule 3.5. Because the issue of post-trial interviews is infrequently raised in West Virginia's circuit courts, 7 this is not likely to
occur in the near future.
IV. DEBATE: NOTABLE PRACTICE OR DANGEROUS MANEUVER?
Regardless of the method chosen, several considerations may be
helpful in revising the existing regulation. Arguments which support
and attack post-trial interviews, as well as constitutional considerations,
may provide guidance to the court in amending the existing regulation.
A.

JustificationsFor Post-Trial Interviews
1. Educational Benefits

Trial lawyers regularly seek reaction to their performance in the
courtroom. Feedback is an important tool in evaluating performance

77. In reporting how frequently the issue of post-trial juror interviews was raised in
their jurisdiction, all judges responded "infrequently," "once or twice," "seldom," "not very
often," or "never." Survey, supra note 1.
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and modifying human behavior.78 Thus, beyond satisfying curiosity or
assuaging bruised egos, post-trial interviews with jurors may assist trial
lawyers in improving litigation skills and increasing overall effectiveness in the courtroom.
Post-trial interviews may assist lawyers in identifying specific
evidentiary problems, such as jury confusion or comprehension of
arguments, or interpretation of factual arguments. Moreover, lawyers
may obtain personal feedback on how their own appearance or particular mannerisms were perceived. Although the verdict provides gross
feedback on the accuracy of predictions, more refined feedback may be
obtained from those who issued the verdict.79 In fact, post-trial interviews may be helpful in voir dire in future trials, actually serving as
pre-trial surveys of prospective jurors.80
Post-trial interviews may also illicit information regarding jurors'
impressions of witnesses, which could be highly useful to lawyers who
repeatedly use the same expert witness. The value of this information
was underscored by the acquittals of Faez Boukarum and John
DeLorean. 1 Following Boukarum's trial, confidential post-trial interviews revealed that the jurors, although strongly opposed to drug-trafficking, acquitted the defendant because the jurors felt that the
government's witness lacked credibility."2 The prosecution employed
the same government witness in Delorean's trial, which also resulted in
an acquittal.8 Thus, a jury's overall impression of a witness, particularly in terms of credibility, is a critical aspect in choosing an expert.
Because clients are often charged exorbitant fees for the use of expert
witnesses, advocates are obligated to provide an experts who effectively communicate juries and and juror feedback is often critical to fulfilling this function.

78. A.C. CATINA, LEARNING (2d ed. 1984).
79. JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND
SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY § 3.11, at 92-93 (2d ed. 1992).
80. Iai at 93.
81. See Marjorie Fargo, Make the Post-Trial Interview Work For You: Don't Make the
Same Mistake Delorean's Prosecutors Made, 3 CRM. JUST. 2 (1988).
82. I&
83. 1d
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In sum, information obtained through post-trial interviews may
help lawyers improve their advocacy skills in future trials or strengthen
a particular case on retrial. Given the limited opportunities for lawyers
to enhance their trial skills and increase their understanding of juries,
this may be continuing legal education at its finest.
Many jurisdictions acknowledge the educational value of post-trial
interviews and authorize them for such purposes. 4 The American Bar
Association also approves of post-trial interviews for educational objectives.85 However, several courts have held that post-trial contact with
jurors for the purpose of-self-education is improper.86 West Virginia's
circuit judges also disagree as to the value of post-trial" interviews.87
This difference of sentiment illustrates the need for more specific
guidance in West Virginia which delineates the permissible uses of
post-trial interviews.
In addition to direct post-verdict contact with jurors, trial lawyers
may employ other methods to gain insight about juries and improve
their skills in the courtroom. Mock trials, for example, help attorneys
sharpen their presentation and formulate trial strategy.88 Additionally,

84. United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (permitted post-trial
discussions with jurors for the purpose of self-education, based on formal opinion of the
ABA); Elisovsky v. State, 592 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1979) (holding that sanctioning an attorney for talking to jurors after a criminal trial is improper if the questions were asked in
order to educate the attorney and help sharpen trial skills); Irving v. Bullock, 549 P.2d
1184 (Alaska 1976) (recognizing that it might be proper for counsel to interview jurors for
educational purposes).
85. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 535 (1967).
86. Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984) (improper for
attorney to interview jurors in order to satisfy own curiosity and improve advocacy);
Sixberry v. Buster, 88 F.R.D. 561 (E.D. Pa 1980) (lawyer not entitled to post-verdict communication with jurors to improve his skills as a lawyer absent a showing of evidence of
juror impropriety); United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (held that
interviewing jurors who had returned a guilty verdict for the purpose of instructing the
attorneys as a guide to future trial strategies was improper and unethical); In re Delgado,
306 S.E.2d 591 (S.C. 1983) (lawyer approaching juror after verdict "does so at his own
peril"; self-education is not a good reason), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1057 (1984).
87. Survey, supra note 1. Of those who commented on the educational value of posttrial interviews, four judges conveyed their appreciation of the educational merits of such
interviews, while four others recognized no educational benefits.
88.

JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND

SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY § 3.15, at 97 (2d ed. 1992).
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they provide trial-like conditions under which clients and witnesses
may experience direct and cross-examination and aid in the jury selection process. 89 The expense of mock trials, however, limits their
availability to clients who can afford them. Further, their simulated
nature necessarily limits their validity and adaptation to actual trials.
Equally limited is the use of shadow juries, employed during an
actual trial by the parties themselves. Shadow juries, which follow the
judge's instructions and all testimony presented at trial, provide lawyers with continuous feedback concerning their impressions of evidence
and witnesses, and comment on the overall progress of the case.'
Although conducted in a. realistic setting, the inherent unpredictability
of juries and the lack of responsibility and legal significance of a
shadow jury's final decision weaken the reliability of this technique.
Comparatively, post-trial communications with actual jurors provide
better feedback and a better examination of a trial lawyer's performance and its resulting effect on jury determinations.
2.

Impeaching the Verdict

After a verdict is returned, in certain situations, an advocate may
want to interview members of the jury to determine whether misconduct tainted the jury's verdict. Post-trial juror interviews may play a
crucial role in protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial as the only
available means of uncovering indiscretions surrounding a verdict. The
Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to a fair trial includes the
right to information which might have prejudiced a jury verdict against
a criminal defendant91 and the Seventh Amendment provides similar
protection for civil litigants. Without direct testimony, however, this
information could be reserved to those involved in highly publicized
trials, where heightened media attention may cause more careful
scrutiny of the jury and increase the likelihood that indiscretions will
be discovered.

89. id
90. Id § 3.15 at 97, 98.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
92. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
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Despite constitutional protection, lawyers have historically been
extremely limited in using information provided by jurors to reverse a
jury verdict. In the infamous 1785 English case, Vaise v. Delaval,93
Lord Mansfield ruled that a juror would not be permitted to impeach
his own verdict, reasoning that a juror who would engage in misconduct is not competent to testify about it.' The rule was adopted in
the United States, but exceptions were developed as well. 95 In McDonald v. Pless,96 the Supreme Court of the United States articulated
its reasons for following the Mansfield rule: freedom of deliberation,
stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors from harass97
ment and embarrassment.
The Mansfield rule and the exceptions that followed have been
codified in Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.9" Accordingly, jurors may testify or provide affidavits to impeach their own
verdict only where extraneous forces influenced their decision.' In
other words, nothing intrinsic to the jury may be used to impeach the
verdict, regardless of the unfairness of the outcome. This includes
93. 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
94. id.
95. United States v. Reid 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851) (adopting the Mansfield rule,
but noting that exceptions might be appropriate in the interest of justice); Wright v. Illinois
& Mississippi Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866) (juror affidavits may impeach the verdict provided they did not concern subject matter inherent in the verdict itself); Mattox v. United
States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (recognizing an exception to Mansfield Rule and admitting
juror affidavits to impeach a verdict because they concerned extraneous influence on the
jury rather than something inherent in the jury itself).
96. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
97. d
98. Rule 606(b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except
that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information
was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any other outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit
or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the
juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
FED. L EVID. 606(b) (emphasis added).
99. i
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instructions,101

coercion or pressure by other jurors," and intoxication of jurors. 0 3
In contrast, evidence may be accepted to impeach a verdict which
was tainted by extraneous influence, including prejudicial documents
introduced into the jury room, 104 coercion or bribery by nonjurors, °5 and outside threats to jurors or family members °6
Although excluding evidence inherent to the jury is justifiable,"°
rendering all verdicts completely untouchable "can only promote irregularity and injustice." 8 The Advisory Committee emphasized this
concern by noting that Rule 606(b) "offers an accommodation between
these competing considerations."'' 9 Despite attempts to maintain a
balance between these conflicting interests, the evidentiary restriction
imposed by Rule 606(b) has produced unjust decisions.11 °
Although West Virginia does not have a parallel state evidentiary
rule, its common law recognizes a general rule of incompetency of

100. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Scogin v. Century Fitness, Inc., 780
F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1985).
101. Gable v. Kroger Co., 410 S.E.2d 701, 705 (W. Va. 1991) (juror testimony that he
was confused over law or evidence not admissible to impeach verdict); Robles v. Exxon
Corp., 862 F.2d 1201, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1051 (1989) (jurors' misinterpretation of trial
court instructions not admissible evidence); State v. Scotchel, 285 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1981)
(confusion over jury instructions is intrinsic to the jury and is not admissible evidence);
Farmers Coop. Elev. Ass'n v. Strand, 382 F.2d 224, 230 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1014 (1967).
102. State v. Scotchel, 285 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1981); New York v. Redd, 561
N.Y.S.2d 439 (1990).
103. See infra note 108.
104. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d
1061 (7th Cir. 1972).
105. Remner v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
106. Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 924
(1978).
107. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
108. Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
109. Id
110. For an extreme illustration, see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (although jurors were reportedly drunk and stoned during trial and deliberations, judge refused
to use such intrinsic evidence to impeach the verdict). But see United States v. Provenzano,
620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (evidence that jurors were
intoxicated and had been smoking marijuana admissible under Rule 606(b)).
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jurors to impeach their own verdict."' Therefore, lawyers who uncover jury misconduct or indiscretion through post-trial interviews may
be unable to utilize that information to correct injustice.
3.

The First Amendment

12
The right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment'
is pertinent to any decision specifically authorizing or restricting posttrial interviews. Absent a specific gag order from the court," 3 jurors
are free to disclose their previous courtroom experiences to the media. 1 4 Jurors often receive handsome profits for their rendition of jury deliberations, particularly in highly publicized trials.1 5 This same
constitutional protection should be afforded to jurors with less profitable intentions who wish to relay their experiences to lawyers after a
trial. If members of the media are permitted to approach jurors after
trial, lawyers seeking information to educate themselves and improve
trial performance deserve equal access. Any restrictions imposed on
communications between jurors and lawyers should be equally imposed
on media members with purely financial interests.

B. Disadvantages of Post-Trial Interviews
Countless arguments have been advanced in opposition to post-trial
interviews. 116 Most notable is the need to protect the sanctity of the
verdict and preserve the integrity of the jury process. "Public policy
111. State v. Scotchel, 285 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1981) (stating that a jury verdict may
not ordinarily be impeached based on matters that occur during the deliberative process, but
recognizing that a verdict may be impeached based on extrinsic matters relating to the
verdict).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. L
113. Jurors are enjoined by specific directives from the court from discussing juvenile
cases, and may be equally forbidden to discuss cases of an extremely sensitive sexual nature. Survey, supra note 1.
114. However, evidentiary rules prohibit jurors from testifying about certain experiences.
See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
115. Jesse Katz, Participantsin King Case Try to Cash In, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993,
at Al; Peter Carlin, What Becomes of the Resurrected?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, at 20.
116.

For detailed treatment of the arguments against post-trial interviews, see Note,

Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1983).
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requires a finality to litigation. And common fairness requires that
absolute privacy be preserved for jurors to engage in the full and free
debate necessary to the attainment of just verdicts."'1 7 Historically,
juries have been protected from intrusive inquiry, particularly regarding
their ultimate conclusions. Condoning an invasion of the jury process
may undermine the public's confidence in the justice system and its
passive acceptance of jury verdicts. Several West Virginia judges expressed similar concerns in the survey."'
Further, jurors should be free to deliberate without fear of retaliation or criticism. Authorizing post-trial interviews without court supervision may increase the likelihood of harassment of former jurors in
the name of advocacy or education. Without the assurance of privacy,
the possibility of exposure may inhibit the open and candid exchange
crucial to reaching a fair verdict. Additionally, jurors may be intimidated to return a socially acceptable verdict consistent with perceived
community preference. Although jurors are often required to take a
public stand, their "willingness to depart from community expectations
becomes even less probable if a wide audience may discover precisely
how much each individual contributed to an unpopular verdict, or
which jurors delayed or thwarted a popular one."119 Knowledge of
such pressure may discourage prospective juror participation, threatening the future of the entire jury system.
Equally problematic is the inherent potential for abuse in the conduct of post-trial juror interviews.120 First, lawyers may refuse to accept a juror's decision to decline an interview and attempt to badger
him or her into submission. Similarly, jurors who do consent to an
interview may be subject to relentless questioning, humiliation, and
personal criticism of their verdict. Second, jurors may be persuaded
that their verdict was tainted. The prospect of a second chance may
tempt lawyers to offer bribes or to conduct baseless fishing expedi117. FED. R. EVID. 606, Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 93-1277
(1987).
118. Survey, supra note 1.
119. Note, supra note 116, at 887 (footnote omitted).
120. For an excellent set of guidelines on how to conduct ethical post-trial interviews
and obtain optimum results, see NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES §§ 13.02-.04 (1991).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 10

1142

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1121

tions, which would ultimately result in unwarranted attacks on verdicts
and excessive motions for retrial. 121 Existing dockets are too crowded
to accommodate the resulting floodgate of litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION

A uniform rule is needed in West Virginia to correct the arbitrary
regulation of post-trial interviews with jurors. More consistent guidelines will ensure fairness to clients and jurors throughout the state and
promote a common understanding among trial lawyers of acceptable
post-trial behavior.
The Supreme Court of Appeals West Virginia should modify existing rules to include specific language regarding post-trial communications with jurors. An immediate exercise of the court's inherent power
to regulate the bench and bar will best serve the goals of efficient and
fair administration of justice in West Virginia and promote public
confidence in our judicial system.
Pamela M. Smolanovich

121. However, this problem is limited somewhat by evidentiary rules which restrict
jurors from impeaching their own verdict. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
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